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ABSTRACT
Impact of UNCLOS III
on United States Naval Operations
Recent announcements from the new federal administration have been touted as the harbinger of doom for the Law
of the Sea Conference. Actually. the Administration may be
following a blueprint developed three years ago.
This paper briefly summarizes the development of the
Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III)
and the influence that national security had on its development. The missions of the navy as promulgated by Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt are: Strategic Deterrence; Sea Control; Projection of Force Ashore; and Naval
Presence. The effect of the Draft Convention, Informal
Text (DC IT) provisions in five areas are discussed. These
areas are: Transit of International Straits; Archipelagos;
the Territorial Sea; the Exclusive Economic Zone; and the
Deep Seabed.
The result of the study is an assessment that there are
no seriously adverse impacts on U.S. naval op~rations in
the DCIT. The sovereign rights of warships are well preserved as is their flexibility and their area of operations
is not harmfully effected. The Informal Text provides the
mi.n i mum Lev e I of order s oug ht by national defense interests
in a regime which protects tradi~ional freedoms of the high
seas and improves upon the former rule of "innocent passage".
t

There are national interests in the Law of the Sea in
addition to those of the U.S. Navy. The deep seabed mini~g
interests do not consider the present text acceptable and
several LOS authorities have disputed the concept of a
ttpackage deal l l where some interests must be sacrificed for
the sake of others considered more important. It is
possible to obtain a treaty which is wholly acceptable and
the United States , should continue negotiations on UNCLOS
III toward such an end.

The New York Times of March 5, 1981 heralded a substantial shift in U.S. government policy under the Reagan
administration toward the "Th i r d United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, when it disclosed that the United States
did not intend to complete negotiations at the impending
meeting in New York, but wanted time to review the entire
I

treaty.

On the following day, State Department spokesman

George Taft was quoted in the paper as unequivocably stating
that the United States would not become a party to the
treaty if it did not provide guaranteed access to the sea2

beds for U.S. mining interests.

Further definition o f

administration plans was reflected in the March 9, 1981
edition of the New York Times.

Tn an acti.on termed "a

second Saturday night massacre" by former LOS Ambassador
Elliott Richardson, the administration replaced acting head
of delegation George H. Aldrich and six top civil servants
on the delegation, and named James L. Malone as the new
head of delegation.

The new delegation will inc]ude some

widely respected experts on UNCLOS I II, including Bernard
H. Oxman and Thomas A. Clingan.

Lee Ratiner, the former

senior negotiator for the Ford administration will also be
on the delegation.

The reason given for the abrupt delc-

gat ion members' dismissal was to establish a " c l e a n break"
IBernard D. Nossitcr, "Reagan's Delay on Sea Pact a
Source of Dismay at U.N.", New York Times, S March 1981.
p. A4.
2"U. S. Wan ts Sea Tr e a ty to Gi.ve Acces s to Mi ne r a l s!",
New York Times, 6 March 1981, p. AS.
ii

with the policy of the previous administration, which had
planned conclusion of the treaty at the New York session

which started on April 10.

The previous week an adminis-

tration spokesman cited "serious problems

tl

with the current

text (DCIT) in the areas of share allocation of seabed
mineral resources as well as the requirement for technology
3

transfer by private companies.
Clearly, a radical shift in Unjted States policy toward the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) has occurred.

The purpose of this paper

is to examine the effects that UNCLOS III would have on
United States naval operations as well as to consider the
implications of a "no

t

r ea t y" outcome on the navy.

Are

the predictions of gloom, doom, and Armageddon coming from
some circles justified, and if not, why?

Whether or not

this treaty becomes international law, it has .ha d and will
continue to have significant impact on international law
and on the performance of several missions of the navy.
The theme of this study will be developed by first
outlining the missions of the U.S. Navy.

A brief review of

the development of UNCLOS II I will be made, including the
influence of nat ional security interests and also the Navy
Department on national policy development.

Treaty issues

from the Draft Convention (Informal Text) (DCIT) which are
relevant to the Navy will be delineated, along with their
3Bernard Gwertzman, lIPresident Replaces Top U.S. Diplomats at Law of Sea T~lks", New York Times, 9 March 1981,
sec A., p. 1, A14.
iii

expected influence on naval operations in the context of
mission performance.

Since acceptance of UNCLOS III at

this juncture is far from certain, it is appropriate to
project the kind of a world the Navy will operate i n without a comprehensive treaty, or with one not accepted universally.

A conclusion completes the treatment of this

topic.

iv

MISSIONS OF THE NAVY
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt,
in 1970, established four general mission areas for the
Navy.

These areas are:

Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control,

Projection of Power Ashore and

~aval

Presence.

What are

these missions and how do they equate to operations?
The strategic deterrence mission has three objectives:
To deter all-out attack on the u.S. or her allies.

The

Navy's fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines eSSBN's)
carries out the strategic deterrence mission.

This fleet

is comprised of 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines, whose ba1listie missiles can be launched at a range of 2500 miles
from a target.

Ten Trident class SSBN's have been author-

ized for construction which will have a missile range i n
4

excess of 4500 miles.

Stealth and concealment of these

ballistic missile platforms is critical to the success of
their mission.

They must be able to travel anywhere on the

high seas without impediment or detection to assure their
availability to respond to an enemy's attack on the United
States or her allies.

Their f r e e dom of navigation is perI

haps the first item in any oceans policy that must be proS

tected.
4Ma r k W. Janis, Sea Power and the Law of the Sea,
Studies in ~arine Affairs (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and Co., 1976), p. 2, 3.

St-'lax K. Morri 5, "The Naval "Ro l e in An Integrated Oceans
Policy", The Oceans and U.S. foreign Policy, Center for
Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia, Oceans Policy
Study series, no. 1:4 (Charlottesville: The Mitchie Co .•
1979), p. 74.

2

The second mission of the Navy is sea control.

Histor-

ically, the term "control of the sea" was used by Mahan to
include denial of the use of the sea to the enemy and assertion of one's own use.

Today, with the advent of submar-

Ines and aircraft, complete denial is no longer feasible,
and instead, the objective is to permit one's usc and deny
the enemy's use of the same sea area when necessary.

The

national objectives which support the sea control mission
include:

To ensure use of the sea lanes; to gain or pro-

vide s upp l i e s ; and to provide safety to naval forces.
This could be thought of as the "traditional" role of the
Navy - to engage the enemy and defeat him at sea.

As en-

compassing as this objective is, so are the forces required
to support it:

attack submarines; aircraft carriers with

their anti-submarine; attack and fighter aircraft; escort
ships; and supporting logistic ships are all integral to
the sea control mission.

The performance of this mission

requires unfettered transit on the high seas.

Ideally,

from the Navy's point of view, territorial seas should be
as narrow as possible to maximize the f l e x i bi l i t y of the
naval forces involved.

Actual performance of this miss ion

would occur during wartime.

Examples include the resupply

of Europe with goods, troops and munitions; amphibious
force protection in transit; and protection of carrier
battle groups during operations.
The third mission of the Navy is projection of power

3

ashore.

There are three categories of project ion o f power

ashore:

Amphibious assault, naval bombardment and tactical

air.

Amphibious assaults are conducted as a combined Navy/

Marine Corps effort to land troops in hostile territory.
Naval gunfire bombardment is used in direct support of
troop landings or operations ashore.

Tactical air projec-

tion ashore can be used to destroy the enemy's warmaking
potential or to support ground forces and maintain control
of the airspace in the vicinity.

A variety of forces

support this mission, including amphibious ships, aircraft
carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines and supp ly
ships.

The rescueing of civilians [rom civil war, as occur-

~

red in Lebanon in 1958, is a corollary to this miss ion.

As

seen in the Lebanon example, a hostile warfare environment
is not necessary for performance of parts of this mission,
although in the normal context projection of power would
occur in a state of war.

The missions of sea control and

projection of power may seem virtually the same.

The dis-

tinction most clearly lies in the objective of the action :(
whether to secure/deny control of the seas or to support

~

land campaign.
The naval presence mission is simply the diplomatic
use of naval forces in scenarios short of war.

It includes

the use of forces to deter actions contrary to U.S. interests or to encourage actions in the U.S. interest.

These

forces may be showing a presence to avert a crisis or ro -

4
sponding to a crisis situation.

The forces available to

perform this mission include all those mentioned previously
with the probable exception of submarines.

A naval pres-

ence force can threaten amphibious assau1t, air attack)
bombardment) blockade or reconnaissance to a particular
area.

It can act to support an exist ing regime under

stress, threatened from within or b eyond its borders.

Al-

ternatively, a naval presence force could exhibit U.S.
support for a coup

dlet~t

of an unfriendly government,

simultaneously encouraging calmness in that state and discouraging interference by other nations.

The mixture of

forces to be used depends upon the type of threat to be
exerted as well as the perceptions of those whom the action
is mednt to influence.

The naval presence mission as a

pOlitical or . diplomatic tool is used in situations short of
war and the ideal objective is to avo id war through the use
of properly applied influence.

Tn order to perform this

mission) a naval force would be required to operate in the
vicinity of the objective area, and the presence must, of
course, be r e c ogn i ze d .
The missions enumerated here arc based upon policy of
6

the Chief of Naval Operations and the Department of Defense.
In Oceans Policy Study 1:4 of April 1978 retired Rear AdmiTa! Max K. Morris used d ifferent descriptions.

He lists

GStansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy",
Naval War College Review, March ~April 1974, pp. 2- 17.

5
naval roles as:

national self defense; assistance to major
7
allies; and protection of vital resource lines and areas.
Admiral James L. IIolloway III, who was Admiral Zumwalt's
successor as Chief of Naval Operations, defined two basic
functions:

sea control and power projection; and set forth

four specific missions as facets of power projection.
These include:

Nuclear deterrence; Amphibious projection;

Conventional (shore bombardment, blockade) projection; and
8

Presence.

These and other dissections of the missions

or roles of the Navy may vary the emphasis in a particular
area, but can still be easily seen to mesh with the mission
statements enumerated previously.

The forces required for

their performance, from nuclear ballistic missile suhmarines to aircraft carriers and general purpose forces, re main the same.

7Morris, p. 74.
8Geoffrcy Kemp and Harlan K. Ullman, "Towards a New
Order of U.S. Maritime Policy", Naval War College Review,
Summer 1977, p. 102-3.
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LAW OF THE SEA DEVELOPMENT
As a subset of international law, the Law of the Sea
has generally developed through a combination of treaty
and custom.

The Third United

~ations

Conference on Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS III) is the most comprehensive attempt
ever undertaken to codify all of the rights and responsibilities of states in the many resource and non-resource
uses of the world's oceans.

Quantum increases in pollution

levels in the oceans in recent years as well as the loss
of fishing grounds from over-exploitation have refuted the
once popular belier in the infinite capacity of the world's
oceans.

Recognition of immense stores of mineral wealth on

the sea floor in tandem with the concept that this resource
is the "common heritage" of mankind and the aggressive
demand of newly emerging states for a fair share of that
wealth mandated the establishment of some set of rules to
regulate the exploitation and distribution to all nations.
A 1945 proclamation by President Truman declared that the
United States regarded the natural resources of the

~ea -bed

and subsoil of the contiguous continental shelf to be subject to u.S. jurisdiction and control while maintaining
that the water column above was still considered as high
9

seas.

Over the next twenty years a trend of increasing

coastal state control developed with several South American
9

Gehard Von Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York:
Macmillan, 1976), p. 317--

7

states, (Chile, Equador and Peru) going so far as to declare
10
unilaterally a 200 mile territorial sea in 1952.
Custornary law in the past could be virtual ly decreed by the
major seapower and by the adquiescencc of other nations,
these decrees would become accepted as law; today such
arbitrary methods seem hardly practical.
The first attempt in this century at codification of
the law of the sea took place at the Hague Con ference of
1930.

The discussion centered on the width of territorial

waters and no agreement was reached due to Britain's re11

fusal to recognize contiguous zones as legal.

The next

codification attempt was at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

This conference drafted four

conventions which are now in force.

They are:

(1) The

Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; (2)
The Convention on the High Seas; (3) The Convention on the
Continental Shelf; and (4) The Convention on Fishing and
Conserva t ion of the Living Resources of the High Seas.

In

order to achieve the consensus required for ratification of
these Conventions, many controversial topics were left
posely vague.

PUy-

For example, the breadth of the territorial

sea was no where specified and the breadth of the contiguous
10Kenneth Booth, "Military Implications i n the Changing
Law of the Sea", in Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues, ed:
John King Gamble, Jr.
(n.p., University of Hawaii, 1979),
p. 344.

ll I bi d.

8

zone was likewise undefined.
In August 1967

Maltar ~

United Nations Representative,

Arvid Pardo, requested the inclusion of this item in the
General Assembly's 22nd Session:
"Declaration and treaty concerning the exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed of the ocean floor, underlying the seas
beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources
in the interests of mankind. 1I 2
The Third United Nations Conference was the eventual
outgrowth o f

Ambassado~

Pardo's statement.

Even before,

there was a growing concern in the United States about
ocean development and about international control of ocean
resources as seen in the results of: (1) the Committee on
Natural Resources Conservation and Development formed by
President Johnson in 1964; (2) the Commission to Study the
Organization o f Peace session o f 1966; and (3) the first
annual meeting of the Law of the Sea Inst itute at the University of Rhode Island in June of 1966.

The Maltese

declaration, then, was more the statement of an

evol~ing

13

concept than a radical departure from precedent.
UNCLOS III, after a preliminary meeting in New York,
convened its first substantive session in Caracas, VenezucIa in June 1974.

The Conference was organized into

12Shigeru Oda, The Law of the Sea in our Time, vall:
New Developments, 1966-1975 (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1977),
p. 16.
l3 I bi d , pp.

3-5.

9

three main committees.

The First Committee was concerned

with the regime of the deep seabed including the methods,
conditions and economic implications o f exploration and
exploitation and development of actual methods for the
same.

The Second Committee dealt with general issues,

mainly zones of national jur i sdiction, including the territorial sea and contiguous zone, international straits, the
exclusive economic zone beyond the territorial sea, the
continental shelf, high seas, archipelagos and islands,
enclosed or semi -enclosed seas and the rights of lanulocked states.

As can be seen, these second committee

topics include all four Conventions produced by the 1958
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, plus several new
and complex issues.

The Third Committee considered the

areas of the marine environment (pollution), scientific
]4

research and the transfer of technology.
At the second session in Geneva in 1975 the chairman
of each main committee was requested hy Conference Chairman Ambassador Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka to prepare
15
Resultant were three
a "single negotiating text" (SNT).
draft conventions revised and negotiated in later sessions.
The present product of the UNCLOS III effort is the Draft

14 I b i d, p. 155-157.
lSRobert B. Krueger, "Where Are We on the Law of the
Sea?" in The Law of the Sea: Issues in Ocean Resource Management, ed: Don Walsfi (New York: Praegcr Publishers,
1977), p. 79.

10
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Tex t ) , or DeIT,
produced by the ninth session at Geneva in JUly/August 1980.
The concept behind an all-encompassing treaty such as
this is that it is a "package deal" which must be accepted
or rejected as a whole.

In other words, any particular

state may find some parts of the convention not in its
ideal best interest, with other parts strongly in its favor
and ratification must be decided upon the summation of all
positive and negative aspects.

In simpler terms, in an

acceptable treaty, the gains must outweigh the losses for
any specific state.

11
U.S. POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
It was 1970 before the U.S. federal government began
to publicly announce its intentions and positions on Law
of the Sea issues.

On February 2, 1970, President Nixon,

in a foreign po l icy report to Congres s , s ta ted tha t

11

the

most pressing issue regarding the law of the sea is the
need to achieve agreement on the breadth of the territorial
sea, to head off the threat of esculating national claims
16

over the oceans."

Previously, on July 30, 1969, the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs stated at a Senate subcommittee hearing that "the
Defense Department considered it important for national
security to define a narrow boundary of the continental
shelf and that the eventual legal regime of the seabed
should have no effect on the traditional freedom of the

17
seas."
On the same day, in a speech in Philadelphia, John R.
Stevenson, the State Department legal advisor and later
chief negotiator, disclosed that the United States had heen
conferring on ocean law matters with other nations over the
previous two years.

He indicated in his remarks that the

United States was prepared to recognize a 12 mile territorial sea, provided that freedom of transit through inter-

16

Oda, p . 120.

17 1h i d , p.

95.

12
national straits and preferential fishing rights for coa stal
18
states could also be accepted.
No mention of a seabed regime was made until President
Nixon's Ocean Policy Statement of May 23, 1970.

In retro-

spect, the President's statement might be considered an

opportunity missed by the international community.

The

president proposed that all national claims beyond the 200
meter isobath be rescinded and that resources beyond that
point be regarded as mankind's common heritage with royalties to be paid to an international body for mineral exp1oitation.

Seaward o f this isobath would be a trusteeship

area, managed by the coastal state and the deep seabed
would be an area under the regulation of an international
authority, which would license exploitation and collect
19
fees.
The DeIT seabed regime bears little resemblance to
that proposed by the U.S. in 1970.
National security interests and the Navy in particular,
played a major role in development of U.S. policy on the
law of the sea.

The first public statements in 1970 and

the congressional hearing referred to in 1969 both espoused
maximum freedom of the seas as a prerequisite position
which could not be compromised.

A clear pattern of "creep -

ing jurisdiction" had continued since the 1958 Convention.

18 I b i d .
19 I b'Id., pp. 96-97.
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RELEVANT ISSUES AND THEIR IMPACT ON NAVAL OPIJRATIONS
Mark Janis in Sea Power and the Law of the Sea identifies three major LOS issues of concern to U.S. naval
operations, including: passage through straits; transit
along coasts; and military uses of the deep seabed.

Since

publication of that book the military use of the seahed
has been relegated to a lesser status in view of a general
consensus in agreement with the United States position,
and other areas have become more prominent.

Five issues

will be discussed in this paper as well as the relevance
of each to the accomplishment of stated naval missions.

-

These issues are:

paggage through international straits;

-

archipelagic passage; transit through territorial seas;
the exclusive economic zone; and the deep s eabed.
Maximum freedom of operations within a framework of
minimal international order is the optimum UNCLOS III outcome from the U.S. Navy's point of VIew.

Any influence or

regulation of the Navy's ability to conduct operations
could be perceived as a loss o f sovereign power.

14
STRAITS PASSAGE
Passage through international straits is a fundamental
prerequisite in the maintainence of freedom of the high
seas.

Closure of international straits would either hamper

or negate access between high seas regions.

The United

States today officially recognizes a three mile territorial
sea, a distance which was supported as customary law by
Great Britain and the U.S. when specific boundaries of
territorial seas could not be agreed upon at the '58 conference.

The alarming increase in states claiming terri-

torial seas of 12 miles or more has already been pointed
out.

During the period between the conferences the U.S.

tacitly acquiesced to these unilateral claims and by her
support of the 12 mile sea in at UNCLOS III gives at least
implicit recognition of them.

Thjs inevitable expansion

of the territorial sea boundaries would enclose 116 of the
world's 125 international straits.

The '58 Convention on

the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. in Article 16.
provides the rule of "innocent passage" for international
straits.

Under this treaty, submarines must navigate on

the surface and show their flag.
of innocent passage unless it

IS

All ships enjoy this right
"prejudicial to the peace,

good order or security of the coastal state."

The coastal

state is proscribed from hampering innocent passage but it
is permi tted "to prevent passage ... which is not innocent. 11
Thus, there remains the possibility that a subjective

15
judgment on the part of a coastal state could close a
str~it
(. / J

i

to U.S. warships.

Although this has not happened

r'~ '-

to day, the increasing authority of coastal states (i.e.
"creeping jurisdiction") increases the likelihood of a confrontation in the future.
A new descriptive term of the right of straits passage
has been sponsored by the U.S. and adopted by UNCLOS III.
The neTT in Art. 38 provides for the right of "transit
passage"

through international straits.

States bordering

such straits are precluded from denying, hampering or
suspending this right.

Transit passage differs from inno-

cent passage in two significant ways:

The right is extend-

ed to aircraft, and there is no requirement for submarines
to surface.

The transiting ships are required by Art. 39

to proceed without delay and avoid any threatening actions
or any action not normal to a transit.
The new treaty thus provides more affirmatively the
right of naval ships, submarines and aircraft to navigate
through international straits without encumbrance.

To

gain this "minimal order", the U.S. would recognize the 12
mile territorial sea, which would probably be recognized
as customary law from its widespread application.

The con-

cealed passage of our strategic SSBN force has gained
acceptance and authorization in netT.

This right of sub-

merged transit was probably the most important objective
of national security interests.

-'; "
,)

~
.~

16
At that time 54 percent of coastal states claimed a territorial sea boundary of three miles or less, and 18 percent
claimed 12 or

mOTC

miles.

By 1968 only 35 percent still

claimed three miles and extensions to 12 miles or more had
20
reached 43 percent.
These unilateral extensions of
sovereign jurisdiction alarmed not only the United States,
hut other traditional sea powers as well.

Both France and

Great Britain support the retainment of traditional navi21
gation rights and freedom of the high seas.
Not 5urprisingly, in view of her relatively recent arrival as a
prime seapower in the world, the Soviet Union also supports
the concept of maximum freedom to navigate around the world.
About 30 states now advocate territorial sea limits between
12 and 200 miles.

Were 200 mile territorial seas to become

accepted, the U.S.S.R. would have ocean access only from
its northern Siberian routes and it would have no access
22
to the Atlantic Ocean.
In short, the Soviet Union has
even more to lose than the United States and other traditional maritime nations from the process of creeping jurisdiction.

20 I b i d.
2l

.
J aTIIS, p. 42, 55.

22Mark W. Janis, "The Abashed Conservative: in Soviet
Oceans Development, National Oceans Policy Study (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1976), p . 289.
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ARCHIPELAGIC PASSAGE
At the '58 Conference, Indonesia and the Philippines
were unsuccessful in their attempt to achieve recognition
of a system of strait baselines connecting outermost islands
and enclosing internal seas.

The effect of such a rul e,

known as the Archipelagic Rule, i s dependent upon the size
of the area enclosed and whether the islands or archilelagos are compact or widely dispersed in their distribution.
The chief objections to this concept came from the United
States and the United Kingdom but both nations appear willing to accept it in the DCIT.

Both nations claim over

eight thousand miles of baselines, enclosing areas of over
six hundred sixty thousand square miles of internal waters
in the case of Indonesia and almost one hundred f ifty thou23

sand square miles in the case of the Philippines.
Three f a c t or s appear to have influenced the change in
United States position on this Archipelagic Rule.

First,

and most obviously is the provision of assurance for ship
and aircraft transit rights through state-designated routes.
Second, and probably as important, is the need to appease
Indonesia, a state which controls straits vital to national
security interests.

Third is the continued pressure to

recognize the special characteristics of archipelagic
states and their right to control the waters among the
23 J . R. V. Prescott, The Political Geography of the
Oceans (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975) pp . 104-106.

18
islands for security and economic exploitation.
The DCIT recognizes archipelagic states and their right
to enclose their waters with baselines up to 125 miles i n
length and consequently has developed a right of archipelagic
passage, which is an innocent passage right through statedes ignated sea lanes and air routes.

The duties of transit-

ing vessels and coastal states rights and duties are identical to those for transit passage through international
straits.
The net effect of the archipelago rule is to i nc r e a s e
substancially the internal waters of the archipelagic state,
thus reducing the high seas area in the vicinity.

Naval

ships would be restricted from these internal waters except
to transit through designated sea lanes, in which case they
must remain within twenty-five miles of the sea lane and
conform to the Juties of ships in transit.

In brief, they

must proceed without delay, refrain from any threat or use
of force and refrain from any activit ies other than those
incident to normal transit.

So, in addition to loss of area

in which to operate, naval ships are restricted f r om tactical maneuvers, flight operations and any other actions not
involved with a continuous and expeditious transit.

Despite

these limitations, the most important i n t e r e s t s to the U.s.
Navy are protected in the DCIT.

Submerged transit by sub-

marines and ship and aircraft transit arc all permitted.
With a loss of flexibility in operating areas has come the

~

I

19
lawful guarantee of transit rights, except when suspended
on a non-discriminatory basis for security reasons.

20
TERRITORIAL SEAS
The regime of innocent passage applies to all ships
traversing territorial waters as it did in the '58 Conven tion.

The meaning o f innocent passage is more

under UNCLOS III.

Article 19 precludes:

well ~defined

the exercis ing of

weapons; collection of information; any launching or landing
of aircraft or military devices; and any other activity not
directly bearing on the passage .

Upon first perusal, this

might appear a severe ,restriction on naval ships.

Consider,

however, that this territorial sea is now limited by sanction of the treaty to a width not greater than 12 miles.
Beyond that, the rules of the high seas apply and there is
therefore no adverse consequence.

The '58 Convention by

its lack of definition o f the breadth of the terr itorial
sea and vague definition of ,i nnoc e n t passage could be argued
to not even provide the minimum order sought.

I

The naval

presence mission could be argued as having been obviated,
but a distance of nine mile J makes little real di fference
24

to this role.

I

The political use of a naval force i n the

naval presence mission is des·gned to influence national
governments.

I

.

.
b ·1t
Its e ff ectIveness
1S not 1 essene decause

canlt be seen from the shore line.

Its visibility is far

more important politically than optically.
I
24Lawrence Juda, Ocean Space Rights, Developing U.S.
Policy, Praeger Special Studies in International Politics
and Government, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 47.

21
Another article of the innocent passage section of
DCIT could be far more detrimental to a naval operations in
territorial waters.

Article 23 requires foreign nuclear

powered ships and ships with nuclear substances aboard to
carry documents and observe international agreements.

The

coastal state has the right under Article 2S to "take the
necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to
which admission of those ships to internal waters ... is subject. l t

This raises the possibility of a coastal state

attempting to interrupt the innocent passage of warships to
inspect the aforementioned documents.

The capability of

U.S. ships to launch nuclear weapons is unclassified and
widely recognized.

The fact of what specific ships arc

carrying nuclear weapons and how many they have aboard is
both classified and closely guarded.
from such a scenario.

Two dif ficulties arise

The first i s the classified nature

of the actual weapons aboard and the other is the infringement upon sovereign rights in the detaining or interruption
of innocent passage of a U.S. warship.

It is unlikely that

the U.S. government would permit any such infringement upon
sovereign power.

Redress of this infr ingement on sovereign-

ty is implied in Article 32, which states that "nothing in
this convention affects the immunities of warships" ... Unfortunately, exceptions to this immunity include the restrictive Artjcle 23 as well as Article 30, which permits expulsion from the territorial sea by a coastal state of any war-
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ship not in compliance with its laws and regulations on
passage.
Relief from these onerons restrictions doesn't arrive
until Article 236, contained in Section 10 of Part XII o f
the DCIT "Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment."

This article on Sovereign Immunity states:
"The provisions of this Convention regarding
the protection and preservation of the marine
environment do no apply to any warship, naval
auxilary, other vessels or aircraft owned or
operated by a State and used, for the time
being, only on government non-commercial service. However, each state shall ensure by
the adoption of appropriate measures ... that
such vessels or aircraft act in a manner con sistent, so far as is reasonable and practica ble, wi t h this Convention."

So here is the roscue from inspection, regulation or
other foreign interference with United States naval vessels
and aircraft.

U.S. units are expressly exempted and in re-

turn for such consideration, they must attempt compliance
when possible with local rules and regulations on pollution.
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THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
This zone is a recognition of the rights of coastal
states to exploit the natural resources of an area beyond
the territorial sea with a nominal breadth of 200 miles
from the coast.

The coastal state is given jurisdiction

over, inter alia, marine scientific research and the protection of the marine environment.
lS

While scientific research

not normally a primary role for naval vessels, the taking

of depth/temperature data with bathythermographs is a routine evolution used to verify local water conditions to
optimi ze employment of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) sensors.
Any attempt to regulate such a normal activity would adversely impact on a ship's anti-submarine warfare capability.
Gunnery practice and carrier air operations arc not specifically regulated, nor are they explicitly permitted.

It

could, therefore, be conceivable for a coastal state to
prohibit such actions as harmful to the environment.

These

gray areas in the DCIT could have serious potential conse quences, but again Article 236 grants warships and aircraft
immunity from environmental restrictions.
Article 58 of the DCIT specifically invokes the high
seas freedoms of Article 87 for the Exclusive Economic Zone.
The jurisdictional immunity of warships from any but the
flag state (Article 95) also applies because it is compatible with Part V (The Exclusive Economic Zone).

Any coastal

state regulation of naval vessels with respect to pollution
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control is denied by Article 236.
The resultant of Part V is an area of complete coastal
state control over resources; some control over shipping
(i.e. pollution regulations permitted by Article 56); but
no permitted regulation of warships, including submarines.
Naval operations are much benefited by the concept of an
EEZ, since it is the negotiated solution to the growing
concern over increased areas of sovereign jurisdiction by
coastal states.

Captain John R, Brock, a U,S. Navy lawyer,

perceived the problem and the needed solution over ten years
ago:
The "creeping encroachments on the high seas
by exaggerated unilateral claims of nations
can and should be mitigated through treaties
and agreements which ... preserve the high seas
rights of all nations for the traditional,
unimpeded usc of these ocean highways for
maritime traffic." 25

25J ohn R, Brock, I1Thrcats to Freedom of Navigation",
The JAG Journal 24 (December 19~9 -January 1970): 357.
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THE DEEP SEABED
With the development of the SSBN fleet in the early
1960's came ideas for military uses of the sea bed such as
underwater missile silos, submerged submarine bases and
mobile sea-floor missile systems.

AI.though technologically

feasible, the cost of such systems could aptly be described
as enormous.

Additionally, there developed strong influences

on the international plane that the sea bed should not be
used for military purpose and that such action was not in
the common interests of mankind.

In the late sixties, it

was realized in the Department of Defense that such strateglC

weapon systems and submerged submarine bases would not
26

be practical.

The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 pro-

hibits the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction on the ocean floor.

Moored mines and listening

devices are not controlled by the treaty due to the refusal
of major maritime powers to submit to such regulation.

Tn

the negotiations for UNCLOS III there have been some attempts
to include regulations on military uses of the sea bed, but
these were successfully resisted by the United States as the
proper subject of

ano~her

treaty (SACT).

It is widely known that the United States (and to at
least some extent, the Soviet Union), makes use of coastal
based stations for tracking foreign submarines in the oceans.

26 Juda, p. 87.
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The interests of the Navy and the U.S. government would be
best served if international-body authority over the deep
seabed is limited strictly to the exploration for and ex ploitation of mineral resources.

This objective is largely

achieved, since Article 157 limits the Authority's power to
those functions expressly permitted in the DCIT.

Despite

f ou r articles referring to the peaceful uses of the seal
seabed (Art. 88, 141, 147, 301), there is no speci fic exelusion of the use of these listening devices.

Considering

the strategic importance of these stations and the ir relation
to nuclear deterrence, an argument could be made in support
of their peaceful purpose.

As appraised by Rao:

"Despite the rhetoric employed and a certain
consistency exhibited in proposing that the
oceans be used exclusively for 'peaceful
purposes', most participants are realistic
about the limitations of such a proposal.
Furthermore, they realize that several of the
security uses of the sea, even though they
cause occasional irritation to particular
states, generally contribute to the stability
of world relations. ,,27

27 p. Sreenivasa Rao, The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Criti ue of the Contem orar Law of the Sea
Cambridge: T e M T Press, 1975 , p . 200.
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CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE
There is every likelihood that the ongoing IJNCLOS III
negotiations will not result in a comprehensive LOS treaty.
It i s , therefore, appropriate to consider what will be the
effects upon naval operations and the ability to perform
naval missions of a continued unstructured oceans regime.
There is, of course, an entire range of possible consequences, but for the sake of analysis, they will all be con sidered as resultants of increased jurisdictional claims by
coastal states.

The specific requirements of the DCIT as

well as its limitations would not be in force.
The strategic deterrence mission could be severely
affected as straits states might claim sea lanes as internal
waters, or apply restrictive or descriminatory regulations
on vessels transiting.

-

Transit by SSBN's, if permitted,

would be required to be on the surface with flag showing.
The determination of whether or not passage is innocent
could be subjective to such an extent that warships or
nuclear-powered submarines could be restricted.

The overall

effect of such actions would be severe to our strategic
fleet ballistic missile submarines.

They could not only be

tracked through straits by potential enemies but the risk
of collision due to their low profile, degraded sensors and
limited surface maneuverability would be far greater than
when submerged.

The area of operations f o r the SSBN force

as well as all other naval forces could be reduced to only
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about 64 percent of the world's ocean if 200 mile juris28
dictions are claimed.
The other naval mission areas would suffer the same
reductions in effectiveness as the strategic deterrence
mission.

As carrier, amphibious and general purpose naval

forces attempt to conduct normal operations they could he
discriminated against in their right to transit through
international straits and archipelagos.

They could be

forced to transit outside of 200 mile territorial waters or
risk confrontation with various coastal states.

Since the

determination of innocent passage would be decided by such
states, this traditional f r e e dom could lose its meaning and
29
be jeopardized.
Inability to transit from the Pacific

~

Ocean to the Indian Ocean via the Indonesian straits would
double the distance traveled while circumnavigating Australia )
and would cause a concomitant reduction in reactive response
30

time.
Failure of UNCLOS III would preclude the right of
overflight of international straits.

Such overflight would

28Thomas A. Clingan and Lewis M. Alexander, ed.,
Hazards of Maritime Transit (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger
Publishing c«., 1973), p. 20.
29David L. Larson, "Security, Disarmament, and the Law
of the Sea:, Marine Policy (January 1979), p. 48
30Mjchael Leifer, Singapore and Indonesia. International Straits of the World Series, no. 2 (Aphen aan den Rijn,
The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), p. 165.
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require coastal state permiss ion which could be withheld
in times of international crisis.

Carrier battle groups

could thus lose logistic support from carrier on board
delivery (COD) aircraft, with a loss in operational readi31
ness and flexibility.
The loss of a well de fined exclusive Economic Zone
with speci fied high seas freedoms for warships could permit
coastal states to challenge such high seas freedoms as weap ons testing, military oceanography, intelligence collection,
subm~rine

patrols and ord inary naval maneuvers.

Such re-

strict ions would vary depending on the local political climate and the degree of jurisdiction (sovereignty vs. resource
protection) claimed over the extended area.

They could very

well vary significantly among different states in the same
geographic area, a further complication to an operational
commander's ability to exercise high seas freedoms.
The consequences of failure outlined above comprise a
"worst case" scenario.

There appears to be a general con-

sensus among authorities on the Law of the Sea that this
anarch istic free-far-all is unlikely to occur.

Professor

Myres S. McDougal of Yale Law School cites the perceptions
of cornman interest, the potential for reciprocity as well
as retaliation and a tremendous global cooperation as factors
influencing the maintenance of a stable ocean order.

He

31Robert E. Osgood, New Era in Ocean Politics, Studies
in International Affairs, no. 22.
(Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 106.
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also points out that among the United States, the Soviet
Union, and Western Europe is the overwhelming naval power
of the world and that these countries have sufficient power
32

to promote their common interest.

James L. Johnston of

Treasury Department's Office of Raw Materials and Ocean
Policy has expressed a similar opinion:
"It is by no means clear that f a i l u r e to reach
agreement in the near term will result in
"anarchy and chaos" as is often claimed. The
legal regime for the oceans during all of re corded history has been characterized by a
general lack of law.
Indeed, most human endeavor remains unregulated by the sort of detailed international law discussed in this
third UN conference. To characterize the
relatively unregulated conduct of human endeavors in general, and usc of the oceans in
particular as bei~§ chaotic would seem to be
an exaggeration.1!
George P. Smith, II in his conclusion to the book,
Restricting the Concept of Free Seas, declares that "the
edge of apocalypse will not be within imminent view if the
Conference should end its working sessions without a popularly subscribed treaty."

He goes on to endorse bilateral

and limited multilateral agreements and temporary measures
and states the belief that decisive action on the ocean re34
gime should be taken by the end of this century.
32 Ry an C. Amacher and Richard James Sweeney, The Law of
the Sea: U.S. Interests and Alternatives (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Publ ic Policy Research, 1976),
p. 158.
33 I b i d . , p. 163.

34George P. Smith II, Restrictin the Conce t of Free
Seas: Modern Maritime Law Re-evaluate
Huntington, N.Y.:
Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co., 1980), p. 120.
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Former U.S. Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, John Norton Moore, in a national ocean policy paper
realizes the importance of naval interests and provides
significant recommendations for the U.S. approach to UNCLOS
III (discussed later).

He also expressed a clear under-

standing of the i n t e r r e l a t i ons h i p of various national interests when he stated that those who expect deep seabed interests to be sacrificed for other interests, "are simply out
35
of touch wi th rea li.ties in the Sena te and Executive Branch. 11
In a rather biting and controversial article for Foreign
Affairs magazine, Richard G. Darman describes the LOS Coo[erence as being peopled with international lawyers and
codifiers who want a neat, static world.

He provides that

failure of the conference might result in a system that is
only marginally less efficient rather than disastrous.

He

raises a question about whether a comprehensive treaty is
even in the best interests of the United States if we are
willing to trade off among desirable proposals rather than
36

linking them.

353 0hn Norton Moore, "A Foreign Policy for the Oceans,"
in The Oceans and U.S. Foreign Policy, Center for Oceans
Law and Policy, University of Virginia, Oceans Policy Study
series, no. 1:4 (Charlottesville: The Mitchie Co., 1979),
p,

5.

36Richard S. Darman, "Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S.
Interests," Foreign Affairs (January 1978), p. 376.
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CONCLUSION
Clearly the provisions of the DCIT developed through
UNCLOS III would provide an acceptable operating environment
for the U.S. Navy.

Recognition of a twelve mile territorial

sea imposes a small limitation on operating areas. which
generally speaking, already conform to the proposed regime.
The archipelago rule restricts operations within waters that
have now been redefined as internal.

Overall, however, the

UNCLOS III regime conveys an order wholly supportive of the
needs of national security and the U.s. Navy.

The new con-

cept of transit rights th rough international straits and
archipelagos ease the concern generated by a twelve mile
territorial sea and the archipelago rule.
submerged transit as well as overflight

Provision for

provide~an

inter-

national order far superior to the resultant of the 1958
Conventions.

Delineation of duties and r esponsibilities

of flag and coastal states

servc~to

remove the adverse

implications from coastal state interpretation of innocent
passage.

The sovereign immunity of warships is re -enforced

in the DCIT and no third party interference is permitted
which would erode that

immun~ty.

The concept of an exclu-

sive economic zone does not infringe upon high seas freedoms
and the international authority's control over the deep s ea
bed is limited only to exploration and exploitation.
The proposed treaty is good for the navy; it provides a
fully acceptable framework for operations now and in the
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future.

Regrettably, as has been made clear in the afore-

mentioned New York Times articles, there arc other national
interests with a stake in UNCLOS outcome that have not fa red
so well.

National ocean mining interests are dismayed with

the prospect of sharing their benefits with developing
nations; with the control of an international body over
their ability to mine, and also with the requirement to provide their technology to such a body.

The pros and cons of

seabed mining are no t within the scope of this treatment;
these problems are pointed out to demonstrate that other
factors,

in addition to an efficacious regime for the U.S.

Navy, must be considered.
Former LOS Ambassador John Norton Moore has outlined
seven steps recommended to enhance the chances of achieving
an agreement acceptable to all U.S. interests.

They are

summarized here:
1.

Abandon pressure for conclusion "in just one
more session."

Make it clear that we are

willing to continue to negotiate, but will
not accept a bad agreement.
2.

Move forward with deep seabed mining legislation that will become a permanent system
only if UNCLOS III does not succeed.

(As

ha s been accomplished by the Hard Minerals
Act).
3.

Fundamentally change the U.S. position on
deep seabed mining, with a Conference shock

34
as the U.S. toughens up on particular weak
points in the proposed structure.

(A current

undertaking, as seen in the New York Times).

4.

Toughen up with respect to the EEZ, particularly marine scientific research and tr eatment of whales.

5.

Avoid illegal unilateral actions (deep seabed
mining is not one) and vigorously protect such
action by other states.

Make it clear that,

absent a treaty, we will not recognize EEZ's,
archipelagos, or any coastal state control
over scientific research

OT

pollution or any

other areas not covered by the 1958 Geneva
Convention or other international treaty.
6.

Work vigorously with like minded states (including the U.S.S.R.) to prescnt a united
policy front.

7.

Work closely with Congressional leaders to
37

obtain their complete support for this policy.
As may be inferred from these recommendations, the change
in policy docs not necessarily portend the imminent destruct ion of UNCLOS III.

It does require a cons istent, unified

approach and patient persistance toward the goal of a treaty
which is f u l l y acceptable in all areas.

37

Moore, pp. 11-13.
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